20th-century philosophy witnessed the development of views sympathetic to relativism and pluralism in various branches of philosophy.  Goodman’s ‘world-making', Quine’s ontological relativity, Putnam’s conceptual relativism and logical pluralism, Rorty’s ‘anti-representationalism,’ and Kuhn’s conception of scientific progress, exemplify this sympathy in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of science.  Although championed by leading figures in analytic philosophy, such relativistic and pluralist views remain highly controversial.  According to some, they are incoherent; according to others, they lead inevitably to skepticism.  

At the first conference of the Middle East Society for Analytic Philosophy (MESAP), we shall discuss the interplay between relativism, pluralism, and skepticism. The conference will explore these connections from a variety of perspectives, such as philosophy of science, philosophy of language, moral philosophy, political philosophy, history of philosophy, metaphysics, and social epistemology.